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CONSUMER NEWS
Supreme Court Restricts State Tort Claims
Against Federally-Approved Medical
Devices
By Thomas A. McCann*
In a case with huge implications for the health care industry
and patients injured by faulty medical devices, the U.S. Supreme
Court in February closed the door to many state personal injury
lawsuits for certain federally-approved medical products.'
The Court ruled in Riegel v. Medtronic Inc. that federal law
preempts any state common law claims against a medical device that
has passed the federal approval process and conforms to its
mandates. 2  The Court reasoned that a state jury should not be
allowed to second guess the U.S. Food and Drug Administration after
it extensively reviews each product and assesses its individual
benefits and risks before allowing it to be sold.3 The decision has
prompted a flood of court filings across the country from device
manufacturers seeking dismissals of state personal injury suits against
their products.4 The ruling also has spurred threats from Congress to
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1 David Stout, Justices Make It Tougher to Sue Medical Device Manufacturers,
N.Y. TIMES, February 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/02/20/washington!20cnd-device.html?ex= 1204174800 &en=le8c689cd5b390
ac&ei=5018&partner-BRITANNICA.
2 Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008).
3id.
4 Barnaby J. Feder, Medical Device Ruling Redraws Lines On Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, February 22, 2008, at C2.
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introduce legislation to overturn Riegel and allow such state lawsuits
to go forward.5
The case before the Court concerned the Evergreen Balloon
Catheter, a medical device produced by Minneapolis, Minn.-based
Medtronic, Inc. 6 In 1996, an Evergreen catheter burst inside Charles
Riegel as he underwent an angioplasty at a New York hospital .
Riegel entered the hospital because he had suffered a myocardial
infarction, and his right coronary artery was both heavily calcified
and "diffusely diseased." 8 According to the opinion, Riegel's doctor
inserted the catheter in an attempt to expand the clogged artery;
however, the catheter's labeling stated that the product would be
risky for patients with diffused or calcified blood vessels. 9 The label
also warned that the catheter should not be inflated beyond a pressure
of eight atmospheres.' 0 The doctor inflated the Medtronic catheter
five times over the course of the procedure, eventually to a pressure
of 10 atmospheres, at which point the catheter ruptured. Riegel
developed a heart blockage, went on life support, and had to undergo
emergency coronary bypass surgery to save his life. 11
Charles and Donna Riegel sued in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that
Medtronic's catheter was designed, labeled, and manufactured
defectively in violation of New York common law and that the
defects caused Riegel to suffer severe and permanent injuries.' 2
Among the Riegels' state claims were breach of implied warranty;
strict liability; negligence in the design, testing, inspection,
distribution, labeling, marketing5 and sale of the product; and loss of
consortium between the couple.
However, the district court dismissed all of the Riegels'
claims, reasoning that the Medtronic catheter was a federally-
5 id,
6 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005.
7id,
8 Id.
91d.
'o Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005.
11 Id.
12 id.
"3 Id. at 1005-06.
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approved medical device, strictly regulated by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, and that federal law preempts any liability
under state law. 14 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissals, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 1
5
At the heart of the case are the Medical Device Amendments
of 1976 ("MDA"), a federal statute designed to replace traditional
state-by-state regulation of potentially dangerous medical devices
with a highly-detailed federal oversight system.' 6  To place such
oversight securely in the federal domain, the MDA expressly
preempts all state requirements "different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable to the device" under federal law and which
"relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device." 7 The
Medtronic Evergreen Balloon Catheter is categorized as a Class III
medical device, which has the most stringent approval process under
the federal system. Class III devices include such items as
replacement heart valves, implanted cerebella stimulators and
pacemaker pulse generators.' 8
The maker of a Class III device must submit to a "rigorous"
premarket approval process, in which the company must produce a
multivolume application with reports of all studies and investigations
of the device's safety and effectiveness that have been published or
should reasonably be known to the company; full statements of all
the device's components and principles of operation; a specimen of
the proposed labeling; and a full description of the methods and
controls used for making and processing the device. ' 9 Before making
a decision, the FDA can refer the product to a panel of outside
experts or request additional data.
2 0
The FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours reviewing each
application and grants premarket approval only if there is "reasonable
14 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
15 id.
16 Id. at 1003, 28 U.S.C. § 301 etseq.
'7 28 U.S.C. § 360k(a)
18 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1003.
Id. at 1004, 28 U.S.C. § 301e(c)(1).
20 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1004.
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assurance" of the product's "safety and effectiveness. The FDA
also reviews the product's labeling to ensure that the product is safe
and effective under the conditions of use set forth in the label, and to
make sure the label is neither false nor misleading.22 Once the FDA
approves the device, federal law forbids the company from making
any changes to the product's design, labeling or manufacture without
filing another application for "supplemental premarket approval. 23
Even after the product receives approval, it is subject to regular
reporting requirements, including reports of any malfunctions; any
incidents in which the device may have contributed to a patient's
death or serious injury; or any new clinical studies or investigations
about which the applicant reasonably should know. 24 In that event,
the FDA can withdraw its approval.
The balloon catheter used on Riegel received premarket
approval from the FDA in 1994, and changes to its labeling received
supplementary approvals in 1995 and 1996.25 In order for these
federal regulations to preempt a state common law claim, the court
had to decide whether state tort law imposed additional or different
"requirements" than those under the federal law. 26 The Court held
that state common law duties do qualify as "requirements" under the
MDA because tort liability means a defendant has violated a state
obligation, and tort claims are designed to be "a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy. 27 Moreover, the Court
said that a state's tort law that requires a catheter to be safer but less
effective than the model the FDA approved disrupts the federal
regulatory scheme in just the same way a contrary state regulation
would.28
Further, the Court reasoned that it was illogical to think
Congress would have preempted state regulations but allowed state
lawsuits and that it was "implausible that the MDA was meant to
21 Id., 28 U.S.C. § 360e(d).
22 28 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(2)(B), 360e(d)(1)(A).
23 28 U.S.C. §§ 360e(d)(6)(A)(i), 360e(d)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(c) (2008).
24 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1007.
27 Id. at 1008 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521
(1992)).
28 Id.
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grant greater power. . .to a single state jury than to state officials
acting through state administrative or legislative... processes."
29
Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinion, noted that a key
purpose behind the MDA was to promote a policy of thorough
cost/benefit analysis with respect to cutting-edge new medical
products. 30  The Court emphasized that the FDA purposefully
approves certain devices that present great risks if they nonetheless
offer great benefits in light of reasonable alternatives in the
marketplace.31 For instance, the agency has approved certain heart
devices for seriously ill children even though the survival rate of
those who use the device is less than 50 percent.
32
In the Court's opinion, at least state regulations "could... be
expected to apply cost-benefit analysis similar to that applied by the
experts at the FDA." 33 A jury, on the other hand, "sees only the cost
of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits;
the patients who reaped those benefits are not represented in court."34
Hence, the Court said, state tort law is even less deserving of
protection. 35 Finally, the Court looked at the text of the statute,
finding that the wording "suggests that the solicitude for those injured
by FDA-approved devices... was overcome in Congress' estimation
by solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical
devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 states to all
innovations.,'
36
The Riegels additionally argued that common law claims like
negligence and strict liability should not be preempted because they
are general duties that do not apply specifically to medical devices.
However, the Court rejected that argument, stating that nothing in the
29 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
504 (1996)).
30 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1004.
31 id
32 Id.
13 Id. at 1008.
34 Id.
35 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
36 Id. at 1009.
" Id. at 1009-10.
[Vol. 20:3352
statutory text supports such a reading.38 The Court found that all
such general tort claims question the regulatory decisions of the FDA
and must be dismissed. 39 The Court, however, did not say all claims
related to the device need be thrown out. A plaintiff may still sue for
damages in state court if she alleges that the medical device at issue
violated the FDA regulations.40 Such a claim would be "parallel" to
the federal rules, and wouldn't impose "additional requirements.'
The Court ruled eight to one that the MDA preempted the
Riegels' state tort claim. However, Justice Ginsburg wrote a strong
dissent, stressing that the decision marks an unwise "constriction on
state authority" in an area where state law historically dominates.42
Ginsburg reasoned that the MDA should be analyzed in the proper
context. Congress passed the law in 1976 in the wake of huge
publicity surrounding the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, which
was used by about 2.2 million women and caused dozens of injuries
and deaths. 3 In none of the media reports did Congress stress the
need to limit state liability claims.44 The real purpose of the
preemption provision, Ginsberg said, was to prevent state agencies
from enforcing their own regulations on medical devices when the
FDA was trying to provide that role, something that California was
actively doing before the federal government stepped in.45
Ginsberg said that the FDA has stated in the past that "FDA
product approval and state tort liability usually operate
independently, each providing a significant, yet distinct, layer of
consumer protection. 46  She further stated the Court's decision in
Riegel "has the 'perverse effect' of granting broad immunity 'to an
38 Id. at 1010.
39 id.
40 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011.
41 id.
42 Id. at 1013.
43 Id. at 1014-15.
44 Id. at 1015.
45 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013.
46 Id. at 1015; Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and
Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 11 (1997).
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entire industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more
stringent regulation,' not exemption from liability in tort litigation."
47
Ginsburg noted that the MDA created no federal
compensatory remedy for consumers who are injured by a product
that went through the FDA approval process, suggesting that
Congress did not intend to preempt state tort claims.48 She stated it
was "'difficult to believe that Congress would, without, comment,
remove all means of judicial recourse' for large numbers of
consumers injured by defective medical devices. Importantly,
Ginsburg stressed that the Riegel decision does not speak to federal
preemption of state tort claims where evidence of the medical
device's defect came to light only after the device received premarket
approval. 50
Within hours of the ruling, its effects rippled throughout the
country's law offices. That same day, the lawyers in a group of
Florida state court cases concerning Johnson & Johnson Co.'s drug-
coated Cypher heart stent received an email from the judge asking for
briefs on whether the lawsuits should be allowed to continue. 51 The
ruling also could have a major effect on mass tort cases against
medical device makers Boston Scientific Corp., St. Jude Medical
Inc., Synthes Inc., and Stryker Corp. 52  Medtronic currently is
defending another state lawsuit in Minnesota, where 600 plaintiffs are
suing the company over a recalled heart defibrillator with electrical
wires that were prone to developing deadly fractures. 53 "Medtronic
probably already has summary judgment motions ready to go,"
Hunter Shkolnik, a plaintiffs' lawyer on the defibrillator case, told the
New York Times. "The next six months will be consumed [with]
fighting about such motions."54
Legal commentators have criticized the ruling for giving too
much deference to FDA review procedures. The FDA handles 25 to
47 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1016 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487).
48 Id. at 1015.
49 Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
50 Id. at 1013 n.1.
51 Feder, supra note 5.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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50 new premarket approvals in a typical year, but the agency also
gives a much more cursory review to hundreds of supplemental
approval applications for changes and updates to the devices, and
under Riegel these under-regulated products are immune from state
tort claims. 55 In addition, U.S. Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) and
U.S. Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) announced after the ruling
came down that Riegel was contrary to Congress' intent and that they
would sponsor a bill to overturn it. 56  Both were congressional
leaders in the passage of the original MDA in 1976.57
Lawyers said they would need to adapt their approach in
future cases in the wake of the Riegel ruling. Among the suggestions
are new lawsuits to attack devices sold in the market under the less-
scrutinized "supplemental" approvals, as well as "parallel" tort
claims based on violations of the FDA regulations themselves,
including instances where manufacturers deceived federal regulators
by providing false or insufficient data.58  However, plaintiffs'
attorneys expressed concern that many judges may dismiss their
medical device tort claims before they can gain access to important
discovery documents that would allow them to make such an
argument.5 9 Legal commentators also expressed dismay that the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Riegel takes away state tort claims as a
real threat to unscrupulous health care companies and a vital
consumer protection against unsafe medical products. 
60
55 Id.
56 Feder, supra note 5.
57 id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 id.
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